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ABSTRACT:  Any  good  theory  of  knowledge  ascriptions  should  explain  and  predict  our
judgments  about  their  felicity.  I  argue  that  any  such explanation  must  take  into  account  a
distinction between three ways of using knowledge ascriptions: (a) to suggest acceptance of the
embedded proposition,  (b)  to  explain  or  predict  a  subject’s  behavior  or  attitudes,  or  (c)  to
understand the relation of knowledge as such. The contextual effects on our judgments about
felicity systematically differ between these three types of uses. Using such a distinction is, in
principle,  open  to  both  contextualist  and  pragmatic  invariantist  accounts  of  knowledge
ascriptions. However, there are some implications pertaining to the use of the “method of cases”
in the debate about knowledge ascriptions.
Ascriptions  of knowledge carry different  messages  depending on the context in  which they were
uttered.  Accordingly,  which  knowledge  ascriptions  are  felicitous  varies  from  context  to  context.
Attributor contextualism seeks to explain this by providing mechanisms that determine these standards
given information about the context of attribution. Invariantist accounts refuse to accept such variations
as part of the semantic meaning (in some narrower sense) of knowledge ascriptions themselves but try
to explain said variance by providing a pragmatic explanation. I will argue that both contextualists (in
their semantics) and invariantists (in their pragmatics) can only provide reasonably precise theories if
they incorporate a distinction of three ways of using knowledge ascriptions: roughly, we can say “S
knows that P” either to (1) introduce or affirm P as an appropriate assumption for the purposes of the
current  conversation  thereby  focusing  on  the  embedded  proposition;  or  to  (2)  introduce  to  the
conversation that S has a certain epistemic state (“knowledge of P”) that will allow us to explain or
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predict S’s attitudes or behavior better, thereby focusing on the subject; or (3) to put forward a claim
pertaining to the meaning or “nature” of knowledge, thereby focusing on the  relation of knowledge.
Which way a knowledge ascription is used leads to differences regarding how information about the
context can be mapped to the resulting standards of knowledge.
I will briefly discuss the respective situations of contextualism and invariantism. Then I will motivate
the distinction between three ways of using knowledge ascriptions and discuss its effect within the
framework of relevant alternatives. I believe that the effects will carry over to other frameworks, but I
find them easiest to understand and to pin down precisely when appealing to a domain of relevant
possibilities.
Accounting for Variance
It is widely acknowledged that ascriptions of knowledge to the same subject with the same evidence
may be  judged to  be  felicitous  in  one context  but  not  in  another.  Instances  of  this  include  Keith
DeRose’s (1992) bank cases in which the “stakes” are different, cases in which a possibility of error
that speakers were not attending to is brought up (in an unobjectionable way), and cases in which
specific norms such as those of scientific inquiry are brought into play. Any linguistically satisfying
account of knowledge ascriptions must explain there divergent judgments of felicity. 
I will here focus on two familiar strategies for dealing with this phenomenon: (a) contextualism, i.e.
accounts that directly allow the meaning of knowledge ascriptions to vary from context to context, and
(b) pragmatic invariantism, i.e. the claim that there is a semantic level of meaning at which knowledge
ascriptions are context-insensitive, but also a derivative pragmatic level of meaning – the meaning that
is actually conveyed – which is flexible in the required way and which can be computed based on the
semantic meaning and facts about the context. So both strategies recognize a level of meaning – which
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may be pragmatic meaning – which varies from context to context and which more or less aligns with
our judgments about felicity.1
While all sides agree that there is contextual variation in what we require for a subject to be described
as knowing that P, surprisingly little has been said on how exactly these requirements are determined.
For example many versions of relevant alternatives theories simply stay officially neutral on the notion
of  contextual  relevance  of  a  possibility  (Goldman 1976,  Dretske  1981)  or  work  with  a  notion  of
closeness or resemblance of possibilities that is context-sensitive in an underexplained way (Nozick
1981, Lewis 1996). More recently, we have seen more precise accounts that bring in notions such as
Stalnakerian  pragmatic  presuppositions  (Blome-Tillman  2014)  or  presuppositions  of  the  current
question  under  discussion  (Schaffer  and  Szabó 2014)  that  can  be  used  to  determine  a  domain  of
relevant possibilities. On the invariantist side, there has been some hesitation to commit to a precise
account of pragmatic mechanisms as this is not part of the invariantist’s central claim (e.g. Unger 1975)
– but this invites the objection that the invariantist may be unable to actually account for our judgments
of felicity.  Many invariantists have thus invoked conversational implicatures (Schaffer 2004, Davis
2007, Douven 2007, Rysiew 2007) or Bachian implicitures (Brown 2006) which has invited a number
of objections (e.g. DeRose 1998, Blome-Tillman 2013, Dinges 2016, 2018) I will not discuss here.
What is remarkable is that all of the accounts mentioned aim for a general explanation and prediction
of our judgments about the felicity of knowledge ascriptions. Of course the pragmatic presuppositions
in different contexts will be extremely divergent, as will be the implicatures generated by an utterance,
but still these accounts suggest a unified mechanism taking us from the utterance or semantic meaning
1 The invariantist can allow exceptions of this. For example, if one assumes an infallibilist version of invariantism this
puts one in a position to say that it is infelicitous to assert so-called concessive knowledge attributions of the form “I
know that P but I cannot rule out all possible errors” because one would thereby be explicitly contradicting the semantic
meaning.
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combined with information about the context of assertion to the conveyed meaning which is the basis
of our judgments about felicity. I will argue that these accounts can only be successful if they appeal to
at least one crucial distinction between three ways of using knowledge ascriptions. A mechanism that is
blind to this distinction is bound to mismatch our judgments of felicity one way or another.
The three things
The accounts referenced above make it natural to ask in any given case why a speaker decides to use a
knowledge ascription.  What is  their  goal in making such an utterance? I suggest that we can best
answer this question by pointing out which aspect of the schema “S knows that P” the participants of
the conversation primarily attend to. There are three options:
 the first relatum, i.e. the subject S, resulting in a subject-focused knowledge ascription (SFKA).
 the  second  relatum,  i.e.  the  proposition  P,  resulting  in  a  proposition-focused  knowledge
ascription (PFKA).
 The relation of knowing itself, resulting in a knowledge-focused knowledge ascription (KFKA).
The difference between these is a difference in how the knowledge ascription relates to the kind of
speech  act  the  speaker  is  performing  –  we  differenciate  here  by  which  aspect  of  the  knowledge
ascription is central to the topic of the conversation. These three options are not mutually exclusive, so
there can be multi-purpose knowledge ascriptions. There also, of course, may be a mismatch between
how the speaker intends their utterance to be understood and how the hearer actually understands it. As
I want to be neutral on whether the suggested threefold distinction applies to the semantic or pragmatic
side of meaning (to not take side on the debate about semantic invariantism), I will leave these cases
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aside.  Here I  will  only discuss what  I  take to be the most common successful uses of knowledge
ascriptions which I think allow for a clear categorization.
First  proposition-focused knowledge ascriptions (PFKAs). We often ascribe knowledge to ourselves
and others to assert the embedded proposition in a way that expresses a strong conviction in it. Such
PFKAs compare naturally to simple assertions (“P.”) or hedged assertions (“It seems that P.”, “My best
guess is that P.”). The subject S is relevant here insofar as it is credited as the (or one) source of that
contribution – so, of course, we cannot simply pick an arbitrary subject when using a PFKA. However,
the  main  point  of  asserting  a  PFKA is  not  to  express  something about  S’s  epistemic  state  but  to
recommend that the discourse participants accept P.2 Consider the following four examples:
BANK (DeRose’s (1992, 913) Bank case B):
Husband: The line at the bank is long. Should we just come back tomorrow [Saturday]? I was at
the bank on Saturday morning only two weeks ago and discovered that it was open until noon.
Wife: We have just written a very large and very important check. If our paychecks are not
deposited into our checking account before Monday morning, the important check we wrote
will bounce leaving us in a very bad situation. Banks do change their hours. Do you know the
bank will be open tomorrow?
2 PFKAs come closest to a view of the use of knowledge ascriptions that can be traced back to Edward Craig (1990). On
Craig’s own view, knowledge ascription save the purpose of identifying an accessible informant who is likely enough to
be right about P for the purposes at hand. In the case of propositional knowledge ascriptions (but not in the case of
knowing-wh), the role of the informant is less emphasized on my account. A version of it that comes closer to what I
present here as the account of PFKAs is an idea due to Klemens Kappel (2010) and Christoph Kelp (2011), namely
what Patrick Rysiew (2012) calls the certification view. According to this “it is [a] central role of ‘know(s)’ to certify
information as being such that it may, even should, be taken as settled, for purposes of one’s practical and theoretical
deliberations”  (Rysiew 2012,  275) I  agree  with Rysiew,  though,  that  it  is  implausible  that  something like  Craig’s
suggestion is the only role knowledge ascriptions play – examples later in the paper will show this.
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Husband: Well, no. I'd better go in and make sure.
HAT (essentially from Austin 1946, 176, footnote)
Mary: Is Mr. Wearahat in the club room? A student wants to see him.
John: Yes, I know he’s in because his hat is in the hall.
DINOSAUR
Me: Any news on the question which color dinosaurs had?
Paleontologist: Well, we know now that some of them had quite colorful feather but we can still
say very little about their skin color.
ALIBI
Assistant: Does Mr. Suspect have an alibi for Wednesday from 3 to 4 PM?
Detective: No, and Mrs. Boss knows that he wasn’t at work at that time.
In all of these cases knowledge ascriptions are used such that whatever proposition is embedded can
be assumed for the purpose or question at hand. In the case of BANK the denial of knowledge conveys
that it is not safe, even with the given evidence, to operate on the assumption that the bank will be open
on Saturday. Meanwhile in HAT we do not have the same high stakes so John can say that it is fine to
operate on the assumption that Mr. Wearahat is in the club room. DINOSAUR is not connected to a
practical decision like the first two cases are – I am here just curious what dinosaurs looked like. Still
there is a question driving the conversation and the paleontologist provides a partial answer embedded
in a knowledge ascription. Finally, ALIBI is distinct in that the subject of the knowledge ascription is
not part of the conversation.  Still,  by using a knowledge ascription (instead of indirect speech, for
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example)  the  detective  conveys that  we can  assume that  Mr.  Suspect  was  indeed not  at  work on
Wednesday afternoon. Mrs. Boss is here mentioned as the source of our information, which is relevant
because she might be an important witness, but there is no apparent interest in her epistemic state per
se.
The  point  of  PFKAs is  to  suggest  that  we accept  the  embedded proposition  at  least  for  current
purposes. Roughly, this will be felicitous if the evidence of the subject of the knowledge ascription
warrants this suggestion. The framework of relevant alternatives is helpful to make a few more precise
remarks here: David Lewis (1996) suggests that that S knows that P iff S’s evidence eliminates every
possibility in which not-P that cannot be properly ignored. With respect to PFKAs we can say that the
purpose of our conversation helps determine which possibilities are ignored in the evaluation of the
knowledge ascription. For instance, following Michael Blome-Tilmann we could say that the pragmatic
presuppositions in the context of attribution restrict the domain of possibilities to those consistent with
them; or we could follow the line of Jonathan Schaffer and Zoltán Gendler Szabó and say that the
presupposition  of  the  question  under  discussion  limits  the  domain  of  possibilities  in  this  way,
potentially together with strategic assumptions we make with respect to this question (see Roberts 2012
for background on this); or we could say that the domain of possibilities is pragmatically limited due to
the shared assumption that speakers are acting cooperatively. My point here is not to commit to one
such strategy but  to  point  out  that  these notions  describe the  conversational  context  of  attribution
without saying anything about the subject of the knowledge ascription. In the case of PFKAs, we only
need  information  about  the  context  of  attribution  itself  to  determine  the  felicity  conditions  of  a
knowledge  ascription.  That  is  to  say,  it  depends  exclusively  on  the  context  of  attribution  which
possibilities the subject needs to be able to eliminate in order to count as knowing that P in that context.
It is worth to comment specifically on ALIBI because this case is a bit of an outlier. Most PFKAs
attribute knowledge to some participant of the conversation (often the speaker herself) or a group that
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includes most or all participants of the conversation (“we know that…”), where it may often be unclear
who  exactly  belongs  to  that  group.  In  ALIBI,  Mrs.  Boss  is  not  present  in  the  conversation.  The
evaluation of the knowledge ascription can still be straightforward as above if her epistemic position is
the same as that of the participants of the conversation in the relevant respects. However, the question
arises  how  to  evaluate  this  knowledge  ascription  if  Mrs.  Boss  lacks  relevant  information  that  is
available in the context of attribution.  For instance,  suppose that Assistant and Detective have just
watched the surveillance tapes from the lobby and both accept (in mutual awareness of each other’s
acceptance) that Mr. Suspect was not in the lobby at the time. Suppose further that Mrs. Boss was in the
office (which does not have video surveillance) all afternoon and can only rule out that Mr. Suspect
was in the office at that time. Finally, suppose that there is no other place at work besides the lobby and
the office where Mr. Suspect might have been. Now, the evidence Mrs. Boss has gives Assistant and
Detective what they are looking for – with this evidence they will be able to rule out that Mr. Suspect
was at work at the time of interest. On the other hand Mrs. Boss cannot, from her own perspective, rule
this out. Speaking in general terms and ignoring the context of attribution for a moment, it is clear that
Mrs. Boss does not have knowledge. 
This  general  judgment  seems  to  be  mainly  driven  by  the  fact  that  this  knowledge  ascription  is
naturally interpreted as a SFKA, e.g. it may (perhaps falsely) predict that she thinks Mr. Suspect is
guilty. It is interesting to ask what happens when we use it as a PFKA, if such a use is even possible.
Let us try to take the perspective of someone in the context given above: imagine you have, without
any remaining doubt, ruled out that Mr. Suspect was in the lobby. The question whether he was at work
then becomes materially equivalent to the question whether he was in the office. The evidence Mrs.
Boss  has  can  answer  the  latter  question,  but  because  you  identify  that  question  with  the  former
question, you simply take it to answer that question, too. In this way it  may become felicitous to say
that Mrs. Boss knows that Mr. Suspect was not at work. But this is far from clear, and I have seen my
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own intuitions differ from those of others here. What we can say, in any case, is this: if we can employ
PFKAs to  establish  certain  propositions  by  attributing  knowledge  to  people  who have  a  piece  of
information that is crucial to us, but who lack important background we have,  then these knowledge
ascriptions ought to be evaluated taking everything for granted that is taken for granted in the context
of attribution.
Second,  subject-focused knowledge ascriptions (SFKAs). These are  knowledge ascriptions  uttered
with the goal of providing some information about the “knower”, for example to explain or predict her
behavior or her attitudes. Unlike PFKAs, these do not contrast with assertion or hedged assertion, but
with ascriptions of belief, conviction, suspicion and many other propositional attitudes. Two examples:
MOCK-FIN
Mike: Do you think we can trick Valery into thinking you’re Finnish?
Me: No, she knows that I don’t speak the language.
CURFEW
Police Officer: Were you guys planning to stay here?
Drunk: No, we know curfew starts in five minutes.
In MOCK-FIN, a SFKA is used to predict Valery’s behavior in a hypothetical scenario and thereby
advise against a certain course of action. In CURFEW, Drunk ascribes knowledge to her own group to
“predict” or announce their future behavior. In both of these cases, the embedded proposition is also
represented as true because knowledge is factive. However, the truth of that proposition is not itself
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immediately relevant to the opening question.3 The SFKA conveys something relevant only because it
ascribes knowledge to this particular subject.
In contrast to PFKAs, the felicity condition of SFKAs cannot be straightforwardly derived from the
background of the context of assertion; but neither can they be explained simply by reference to the
subject’s epistemic state. On the one hand, knowledge ascriptions represent the embedded proposition P
as true, so its felicity must require that it is felicitous to represent P as true in the context of attribution.
Furthermore, the background assumptions of the context of attribution do seem to carry over to these
cases. For example, working with common ground for the moment, if it is not common ground in the
context of attribution that we are not deceived by an evil demon (i.e. this is a skeptical context), SFKAs
then will not be felicitous if they ascribe knowledge of the external world to anyone. But there are also
contexts of attribution where participants of the conversation share a great deal of common ground.
Speakers in such contexts may judge a SFKA felicitous even if neither they themselves nor the subject
of the knowledge ascription are in a position to rule out some possibilities that are inconsistent with
their common ground.
On the other hand and in contrast to PFKAs, there are limits to this effect. Specifically, knowledge
ascriptions of this kind cannot be felicitous if the subject does not accept part of what the participants
of the conversation accept as common ground and if the relevant propositions are presupposed in the
knowledge ascription. For instance, the SFKA in MOCK-FIN cannot be felicitous in virtue of the fact
3 Nonetheless, the truth of P may be indirectly relevant. To see this, consider the contrast with belief attributions, which
can also serve as a way of explaining or predicting attitudes or behavior. Had I said in MOCK-FIN “she believes I don’t
speak the language”, the prediction that we cannot fool Valery would have failed insofar as this may be a false belief. If
I did speak Finnish, it would be easy to correct her belief and then make her think I was actually Finnish. However,
using “knows” clarifies that her epistemic position is more stable than that and therefore allows different predictions. A
similar  difference  between  knowledge  and  belief  attributions  arises  from cases  of  true  beliefs  that  are  based  on
inadequate evidence.
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that it is common ground between the participants of the conversation that I do not speak Finnish – if
Valery does in fact not accept that I do not speak Finnish and the participants of the conversation are
aware of this fact, then my utterance will clearly be infelicitous. At least one of the reasons for this is
the fact  that  in  such a  case the knowledge attribution would completely fail  to  predict  or explain
Valery’s behavior or attitudes. Compare this to the variant of ALIBI that I discussed above where Mrs.
Boss’s behavior or attitudes are presumed to be irrelevant to the conversation. This suggests that we
can only limit the domain of possibilities for SFKAs to those consistent with common ground insofar
as the subject also accepts the relevant propositions. But note also that, per the preceding paragraph,
propositions that the subject accepts but that are not accepted by the participants of the conversation do
not limit the domain of possibilities as it is infelicitous to represent them as true in the context of
attribution. So in contrast to PFKAs, SFKAs convey an epistemic state that requires being able to rule
out all possibilities that are not presupposed to be false or accepted to be false or properly ignored or
excluded in some other way (depending on your favorite approach to knowledge ascriptions) by both
the participants of the conversation in the context of attribution and the subject herself.
Finally,  knowledge-focused knowledge ascriptions (KFKAs). Note that both PFKAs and SFKAs are
made to convey something relevant to some independent question or purpose. But there are a few
contexts  in  which  knowledge itself  is  the  topic  of  the  conversation.  These  are  almost  exclusively
philosophical contexts; in a sense, making knowledge the topic of a conversation simply is to make a
conversation philosophical. It is natural, then, to contrast these with claims containing semantic ascent
such as “It is false that S knows that P” where the knowledge ascription itself is made a topic of the
conversation, too. Of course, epistemology has produced a vast range of such cases. Here are three
examples that appear to fall in this category:
GETTIER (Gettier 1963, here a version from Weinberg et al. 2001)
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Bob has a friend, Jill, who has driven a Buick for many years. Bob therefore thinks that Jill
drives an American car. He is not aware, however, that her Buick has recently been stolen, and
he  is  also  not  aware  that  Jill  has  replaced  it  with  a  Pontiac,  which  is  a  different  kind  of
American car. Does Bob really know that Jill drives an American car, or does he only believe it?
MOORE (an unfairly short version of Moore 1939)
Here is one hand, there is another. This proves that I have two hands, and therefore I know that I
have two hands. But this means I also know that an external world exists.
WITTGENSTEIN (Wittgenstein 1969, 151)
I should like to say: Moore does not know what he asserts he knows, but it stands fast for him,
as also for me; regarding it as absolutely solid is part of our method of doubt and enquiry.
GETTIER simply concerns the question whether Bob knows that Jill drives an American car. In the
context of an experimental study (which is where this version of the problem was used) this is asked as
an “out of the blue” question. In the context of Gettier’s original paper, there was a broader question in
the background, but this question, too, concerned the concept of knowledge or how we could define
knowledge. MOORE and WITTGENSTEIN are examples of philosophers arguing about the question
whether we know that an external world exists. Moore uses the claim that he knows that he has two
hands to argue for the further claim that he knows that an external world exists. The latter claim is an
immediate answer to the question whereas the former claim is best understood as a part of a strategy of
answering that question. In WITTGENSTEIN, both claims are rejected. As both represent positions by
legitimate  philosophers,  it  is  therefore  natural  to  suppose  that  in  these  contexts  there  is  room for
disagreement.
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GETTIER straightforwardly asks us whether Bob knows that Jill owns an American car. Note that it
may not be clear to the someone being polled like this whether this question concerns the truth or the
felicity of that statement. But let us take it as a question regarding the truth of “Bob knows that Jill
owns an American car.” There is something presupposed or shared as common ground between the
pollster  and  the  pollee  about  the  situation  here,  namely  the  truth  of  the  case  description.  This
description includes some statements about what Bob thinks and is (not) aware of as well as some
information about the reality of things (partly conveyed by the factivity of “awareness”). There is also
the presumption that there are no other very unusual circumstances relevant to the question applying to
Bob.4 The pollee is asked to suppose these things. Beyond this, the context and the question asked do
not seem to introduce any further statement into the background on which the pollee is asked to give
her opinion.5 In particular, it is clear enough that the embedded proposition is true (supposing the case
description), so we cannot treat this as a PFKA, and there is no indication of further interest in the
subject’s mindset or behavior, although it is still possible that some pollees treat this as a SFKA. There
then appears to be no context-related reason for the pollee to ignore any possibilities when evaluating
the knowledge ascription. Given all this, we should assume that the pollee will (or should) evaluate
simply  the  semantic truth  conditions  of  the  knowledge  ascription  “Bob  knows  that  Jill  owns  an
American car” in the pollee’s own context (if  this  is  relevant).6 Note that  therefore the context  of
4 This is a pragmatically conveyed aspect of the case description: it can be assumed that the case description will contain
all relevant aspects of the situation given that the pollee is asked for a judgments about it. This is not a problem for the
idea that the pollee is asked to evaluate the semantic meaning of knowledge ascriptions: they can be asked to make this
evaluation in a way that involves pragmatic processes that set up the question.
5 Except possibly the statement that the pollee is capable of answering the question.
6 This is completely compatible with a contextualist account. For example, Lewisians can say that the relevant truth
conditions are infallibilist as there is no restriction of the domain of relevant possibilities.
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attribution here is identical to the context of evaluation7 – unlike in BANK, where the knowledge
ascription  was  uttered  by  a  subject  within the  case  and  that  subject  was  denying  that  knowledge
ascription as an answer to an independent question.
MOORE and WITTGENSTEIN are different insofar as they do not talk about any specific subject’s
knowledge  of  anything,  but  about  knowledge  that  we  all  supposedly  have.  Again,  the  embedded
proposition here is not by itself important to us: Wittgenstein begins On Certainty by stating: “If you do
know that here is one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest” (OC 1). But neither is any specific individual
of interest to us: while the examples above are technically concerned with G.E. Moore, he only appears
as a representative of humanity. Once again, the question then concerns the relation of knowledge itself
and once again it seems that it is to be answered by applying the semantic meaning of knowledge
ascriptions to these examples. What is interesting, though, is that Moore and Wittgenstein disagree on
whether we actually have the relevant knowledge – and beyond this, we still have no agreed upon
semantics of knowledge ascriptions despite decades of philosophical inquiry. There are two possible
explanations for this: (a) we have not identified any reliable means of accessing the semantic meaning
of knowledge ascriptions, or (b) in some cases we confuse questions about the semantic meaning with
questions about the quotidian felicity of knowledge ascriptions. Discussing this further goes beyond the
scope of this paper.
To sum up, here is an overview over the three types of uses of knowledge ascriptions that I have
discussed:
compare to goal contextual effects





7 Which is not to say that we could not have KFKAs where those are distinct: we could have set GETTIER up as a case
about a subject that is posited a Gettier case and is asked for her opinion.
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SFKAs belief ascription; other 
attitude ascriptions
explain or predict subject’s 
attitudes or behavior
as PFKAs insofar as shared by 
subject
KFKAs semantic ascent understand the relation of 
knowledge
only explicit modifications
Table 1: Summary of the three types of uses for knowledge ascriptions. 
Table 1 gives the natural contrast class for the knowledge ascription, the goal with which these are put
forward, and the contextual effects, i.e. the extent to which certain possibilities may be discarded as
irrelevant to the evaluation of the knowledge ascription (e.g. because they are ruled out by common
ground). The crucial aspect is that the conveyed content depends on different aspects of the context:
PFKAs will be felicitous if the subject has evidence that meets the contextually required standards – in
terms of relevant alternatives, the subject needs to have evidence that eliminates all non-P possibilities
that are not ruled out by features of the context of assertion. In the case of SFKAs, felicity will further
require that the subject accepts the proposition that guide these standards, too – they will need to accept
propositions  that  rule  out  the  omitted  possibilities.  In  the  case  of  KFKAS  that  are  successsfully
interpreted as such, we will judge them felicitous based on their semantic truth. Thus our judgments of
felicity depend on different features depending on the type of knowledge ascription used, and therefore
any explanation of these judgments needs to accommodate this distinction.
One final caveat on this distinction is in order: I have not provided any conclusive evidence that the
threefold distinction I suggested here exhausts all possible ways of using knowledge ascriptions. The
fundamental question that led to this distinction was the question for the goal of the relevant utterance
of “S knows that P” – I have suggested that this goal may be to understand S’s epistemic position, to
understand our own epistemic position, or to understand knowledge itself. I think that these are the
most typical goals associated with knowledge ascriptions (the first two being more typical). The idea
that some aspect of the utterance “S knows that P” (i.e. “S”, “knows”, or “that P”) must be our focus
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when making this  utterance  may make it  seem plausible  that  the distinction is  indeed exhaustive.
However,  I  see  no  principled  reason  why  there  could  not  be  other  goals  for  using  knowledge
ascriptions. My point here merely is that there are at least the three types of uses discussed, and that the
contextual effects will greatly vary depending on the type in question. If there are further types, what I
have said about the three types discussed here will hold up, but we will need to do further work to
explore how context affects the conveyed content for those additional types.
Ramifications
I have argued that there is a distinction of three ways of using knowledge ascriptions that must be
taken into  account  when we try to  explain  our  judgments  of  felicity  of  knowledge ascriptions.  In
principle,  the  distinction  I  have  suggested  is  compatible  both  with  contextualist  and  invariantist
accounts. My point here is not to argue for one side of that dispute, but rather to suggest that both sides
should allow for a distinction like this. However, there are a few methodological upshots that I would
like to comment on in closing.
Before this, let me note that I do not claim that the distinction I have advocated is the only distinction
that needs to be taken into account. In particular, Mikkel Gerken’s (2017) directive force account that
argues  we  often  (but  not  always)  treat  knowledge  ascriptions  as  appropriate  assumptions  to  base
practical decisions on and evaluate them accordingly. Whether or not knowledge ascriptions are treated
this way may well be an important distinction among PFKAs.
As I have noted, nothing that I have said overthrows either contextualism or invariantism. However, I
think that there are a few noteworthy points relevant to some of the arguments made in that debate. The
disagreement between contextualists and invariantists is a disagreement about the semantic meaning of
knowledge ascriptions; both sides can agree on what is ultimately communicated by uttering them.
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Given this, it seems that to settle the dispute it would seem easiest to look at KFKAs, as our judgments
about them should be directly driven by the semantic meaning. However, contextualists could object
that KFKAs are made in very specific contexts and will not give us the full picture of the semantic truth
conditions.  It  is  also  noteworthy though that  bank cases  –  which  are  central  to  some versions  of
contextualism –  are  instances  of  PFKAs.  These  cases  are  put  forward  as  essentially  involving  a
decision to be made, and the knowledge ascription in question concerns a proposition that this decision
depends on. Therefore, these cases generate an interest in the truth of that proposition (and the level of
warrant we have for it).8
However, that is not to say that bank cases are irrelevant. To the contrary, we need to account for all
knowledge  ascriptions  in  a  systematic  way.  While  bank  cases  in  principle  lend  themselves  to  a
pragmatic account, it is not entirely clear how the details of such an account should look like. Much of
this  will  depend on whether  the invariantist  starts  with an infallibilist  or  a  fallibilist  semantics  of
knowledge ascriptions.
As I said, insofar as semantics is concerned KFKAs are the most straightforward source of evidence –
even  though  their  scope  as  evidence  may be  limited.  However,  it  is  important  to  re-emphasize  a
cautionary  note:  the  way I  have  construed  KFKAs,  their  felicity  is  determined  by  their  semantic
meaning (in that context). It is very easy to slip into evaluating the same knowledge ascription  as a
PFKA or SFKA. For instance, it can be very easy to side with Moore that we know that we have hands
simply because for all intents and purposes, we can reasonably assume that we have hands. But if we
8 To transform a bank case into a case involving a KFKA, one would need to invoke the knowledge ascription from
outside the case. For example, a philosopher commenting on DeRose’s case could claim that Husband really doesn’t
know that the bank will be open tomorrow. But note that an invariantist may find it much easier to disagree with this
philosophical utterance than to say that Husband’s in-case denial of knowing this is infelicitous. On the other hand, it is
far from clear that the invariantist is right either: inasmuch as I have any intuitions at all about whether Husband really
knows that the bank will be open tomorrow, I suspect them to be theory-driven.
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do this, we are no longer taking this statement as a KFKA. Rather, we are evaluating it as a PFKA by
imagining contexts in which the question whether we have hands is of any further importance. To keep
focus on the notion of knowledge itself is surprisingly difficult. Peter Unger (1975, 85) suggests that
this can be achieved by asking whether someone really knows a certain proposition, and this is what
happens in GETTIER. But there may be further implications to that modification, too.
To end on a  more  optimistic  note,  a  source  of  evidence  that  may prove very  helpful  are  cross-
contextual judgments. The reason is this: if we explain the felicity judgments on knowledge ascriptions
in pragmatic terms, we should expect that these effects become less salient if the knowledge ascription
is evaluated from a different context that lacks the invoked features. However, if we think that the
semantic  features of knowledge ascriptions are responsible  for the judgment of felicity,  we should
expect these judgments to remain relatively unaffected – at least insofar as the subject keeps a focus on
the  relevant  features  of  the  context  of  attribution.  In  particular,  we should  be interested  in  cross-
contextual judgments between contexts containing KFKAs and contexts containing PFKAs, as these
are most different from one another with respect to potential pragmatic effects that are in place.9
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